Patent Pools and Clearinghouses in the Life Sciences: Back to the Future by Van Overwalle, Geertrui
  1
Patent pools and clearinghouses in the life sciences: back to the future 
 
 
Geertrui Van Overwalle 
 
 
Paper submitted in February 2016 for publication in: Research Handbook on IP and the 
Life Sciences, D. Matthews & H. Zech (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2016 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Patents in the life sciences sector have sparked considerable debate over the past years. 
The grant of a series of patents for the screening of breast cancer (BRCA) genes led to 
wide controversy in Europe, the US and Australia.1 The grant of patents for plants 
resulting from essentially biological processes, notably tomatoes with reduced fruit water 
content and broccoli with anti-cancer potential, also spurred stormy disputes.2 Decisions 
on the scope of plant biotech patents equally fueled a legal battle.3 Last but not least, the 
grant of patents for human embryonic stem cells in the US, triggered fierce discussions in 
Europe.4 
 
In the ongoing debate, concern has been expressed about the potential hindering effect on 
innovation of the continuous increase of patents in the life sciences. The academic debate 
on the possible discouraging impact of the proliferation of patents was set in motion by 
the seminal article from Heller and Eisenberg ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research’ in 1998.5 Over the years, various strategies have been 
                                                 
The author is very grateful to Amandine Léonard for her valuable research assistance. 
1 For details, see chapters 1.4 (Waechter), 1.5 (Minssen), 1.6 (Gosh) and 1.7 (Rimmer) in the present book. 
Also see G. Matthijs, I. Huys, G. Van Overwalle & D. Stoppa-Lyonnet, ‘The European BRCA Patent 
Oppositions and Appeals: Coloring inside the Lines’ [2013] 31 Nature Biotechnology, 704-710; I. Huys, G. 
Matthijs & G. Van Overwalle, ‘The Fate and Future of Patents on Human Genes and Genetic Diagnostic 
Methods’ [2012] 13 (6) Nature Reviews Genetics, 441-448; Van Overwalle, G. ‘Gene Patents and Human 
Rights’, in Intellectual Property and Human Rights [2015] Paul L. C. Torremans (ed.), Kluwer Law 
International, 871-914. 
2 For details, see chapters 2.1 (Würtenberger), 2.2 (Kock), 2.3 (Janis) and 2.4 (Allred) in the present book. 
Also see, Van Overwalle, G., ‘Smart Innovation and Inclusive Patents for Sustainable Food and Health 
Care: Redefining the Europe 2020 Objectives’, in Constructing European Intellectual Property. 
Achievements and New Perspectives, Geiger, C. (ed.), Edward Elgar, 2013, 231-254. 
3 For details, see chapter 2.6 (Metzger) in the present book. Also see, Van Overwalle, G. ‘The CJEU 
Monsanto Soybean Decision and Patent Scope: As Clear As Mud’, International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law (IIC), 2011, 1-3. 
4 For details, see chapters 3.1 (Plomer) and 3.2. (Golden) in the present book. Also see Hellstadius, Å., A 
Quest for Clarity. Reconstructing Standards for the Patent Law Morality Exclusion (PhD Stockholm 
University), Stockholm, April 2015. 
5 M. A. Heller & R. S. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research’ [1998] 280 Science 698. 
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suggested in scholarly literature to mitigate the alleged hindering effect.6 A first 
suggestion was to narrow down patentable subject matter, notably to carve out human 
genes from patent protection. This approach was applied in the recent verdicts of the US 
Supreme Court7 and the Australian High Court.8 In the slipstream of those verdicts, the 
patentability of human genes might be challenged before the Court of Justice of the EU, 
based on the argument that isolated human genes do not meet the definition of 
‘invention’. A second approach was to strengthen patentability requirements. The “raise 
the bar” approach to grant “high quality patents” is still pursued today.9 A third approach 
was to limit the scope of patents, and insert purpose bound protection.10 A fourth 
response was to broaden exemption regimes in patent law, more in particular widen the 
research exemption.11 In the same vein, the introduction of a so-called breeder’s 
exemption is contemplated at present.12 
 
Our past research aimed at contributing to the anti-commons debate in two ways. A first 
objective was to assess whether the prevailing assumption that an anti-commons problem 
was present in biomedical sciences held out in the field of human genetics. Despite the 
level of academic interest, the anti-commons theory remained largely untested at the 
time. Initial empirical research carried out at by Jensen and Murray, mainly applying a 
quantitative approach, seemed to confirm the anti-commons hypothesis.13 In contrast, our 
research, applying a more qualitative assessment of gene patent claims, did not confirm 
                                                 
6 For a concise review, see G. Van Overwalle, ‘Turning Patent Swords into Shares’, 330 Science, [2010] 
(issue 6011), 1630-1631 and the references cited there. 
7 US Supreme Court, June 13 2013 (Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics Inc. et 
al.) (available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-398_1b7d.pdf, last visited October 27 
2015).The Supreme Court held that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not 
patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally 
occurring. 
8 High Court of Australia, October 7 2015 (D'arcy V Myriad Genetics Inc & Anor), HCA 35 (available at 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/judgment-summaries/2015/hca-35-2015-10-07.pdf, last 
visited October 12, 2015). The High Court held that an isolated nucleic acid, coding for a BRCA1 protein, 
with specific variations from the norm that are indicative of susceptibility to breast cancer and ovarian 
cancer (BRCA), was not a "patentable invention" within the meaning of s 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990. 
For an in-depth analysis, see L. Palombo, EIPR (forthcoming). 
9 Cf. EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board, Report on Patent Quality, European Patent Office, 
May 7 2012, Munich (available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/esab/workshops.html, last visited 
October 14, 2015). On the notion of ‘high quality patents’ the interested reader might care to consult G. 
Van Overwalle, ‘The Impact of Emerging Market Patent Systems on Europe: Awaiting ‘The Rape Of 
Europa’?, in Emerging Markets and the World Patent Order, F. M. Abbott, C. M. Correa & P. Drahos 
(eds.), Edward Elgar, 2013, 355-368. 
10 For a comprehensive review on this topic, see J. Lai, ‘Gene-related inventions in Europe: purpose- vs 
function-bound protection’ [2015] 11 Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, 449-473. 
11 For an interesting review on this topic, see E. Van Zimmeren, & G. Van Overwalle, ‘A False Sense of 
Security Offered by Zero-Price Liability Rules? Research Exceptions in the United States, Europe and 
Japan in an Open Innovation Context’, in Patent Law in Global Perspective, R. L. Okediji & M. A. Bagley, 
(eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press [2014] 379-417. 
12 Cf. article 27 (3) Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, Brussels, 11 January 2013 (available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu, last visited November 17, 2015). 
13 K. Jensen & F. Murray, ‘Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome’ [2005] 310 Science, 
239–240. Cf. M. M Hopkins, S. Mahdi, P. Patel & S. Thomas, ‘DNA Patenting: The End of an Era?’ 
[2007] 25 Nature Biotechnology, 185-187. 
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the emergence of a wide patent thicket in human genetics.14 However, our empirical 
study found that there was some reason for concern in the field of diagnostic testing, in 
view of the upsurge of whole genome sequencing. 
A second objective or our research was to explore solutions to the acclaimed anti-
commons problem in the field of genetics. Rather than focusing on legislative (public 
ordering) measures, we explored to what extent collaborative licensing mechanisms 
(private ordering measures), such as patent pools and clearinghouses, could act as useful 
mechanisms to remedy possible adverse effects of fragmentation in the area of genetics.15 
Our research found that the major challenge to implement collaborative rights institutions 
in the genetic field was not so much conceptual in nature – implying that such models 
could be moulded into a genetic context – but rather related to the economic viability of 
those models in a genetic milieu. Tuned down by a sense of realism, we concluded that 
the best option was either to concentrate on patent pools set up around a limited 
technological field, or on well focused patent standard clearinghouses.16 
 
The present chapter aims at re-visiting our former insights in a present-day context. First, 
we want to re-examine the patent proliferation phenomenon and related anti-commons 
problem by investigating the patent growth and re-assessing the existence of patent 
thickets in the life sciences (Section 2). Second, and most importantly, we wish to re-visit 
the collaborative license solution, by taking stock of new models and trends (Section 3), 
and by carrying out an in-depth analysis of operative models (Section 4). We close by 
summarizing lessons learned from the past, which might be meaningful for (re-)writing 
the future (Section 5). 
 
                                                 
14 See I. Huys, N. Berthels, G. Matthijs & G. Van Overwalle, ‘Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic 
Diagnostic Testing’ [2009] 27 Nature Biotechnology, 903-909. Also see E. van Zimmeren, Towards a New 
Patent Paradigm in the Biomedical Sector? Facilitating Access, Open Innovation and Social Responsibility 
in Patent Law in the US, Europe and Japan, PhD, Leuven University [2011], 16 May 2011, 110-126 (on 
file with the author – hard copy available in the library of the Faculty of Law, Leuven University, 
Tiensestraat 41, 3000 Leuven, Belgium – see http://bib.kuleuven.be/rbib/). 
15 See G. Van Overwalle, ‘Designing Models to Clear Patent Thickets in Genetics’, in Working within the 
Boundaries of Intellectual Property, R. Dreyfuss, H. First D. and Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford, OUP, 2010, 
305-324 (further abbreviated as G. Van Overwalle [2010]); G. Van Overwalle (ed.), Gene Patents and 
Collaborative Licensing Models. Patent Pools, Clearinghouses, Open Source Models and Liability 
Regimes, Cambridge, CUP, 2009; G. Van Overwalle, ‘Of Thickets, Blocks and Gaps: Designing Tools to 
Resolve Obstacles in the Gene Patents Landscape’, in Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models, 
Van Overwalle, G. (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 381-463 (further abbreviated as 
G. Van Overwalle [2009]); G. Van Overwalle et al., ‘Models for Facilitating Access to Patents on Genetic 
Inventions’, 7 Nature Review Genetics, 2006, 143 ff. Also see E. van Zimmeren, S. Vanneste, G. Matthijs, 
W. Vanhaverbeke & G. Van Overwalle, ‘Patent Pools and Clearinghouses in the Life Sciences’ [2011] 29 
(11) Trends in Biotechnology, 569-576; E. van Zimmeren, ‘Clearinghouse Mechanisms in Genetic 
Diagnostics: Conceptual Framework’, in Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models, G. Van 
Overwalle (ed.), Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 63-119; E. van Zimmeren, B. Verbeure, G. Matthijs & G. Van 
Overwalle, ‘A Clearinghouse for Diagnostic Testing: the Solution to Ensure Access to and Use of Patented 
Genetic Inventions?’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 2006, 352-359; Verbeure, B., ‘Patent 
Pooling for Gene-Based Diagnostic Testing: Conceptual Framework’, in Gene Patents and Collaborative 
Licensing Models, G. Van Overwalle (ed.), Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 3-32; B. Verbeure, E. van Zimmeren, 
G. Matthijs & G. Van Overwalle, ‘Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing’, 24 Trends in Biotechnology, 2006, 
115. 
16 See G. Van Overwalle [2009] footnote 15. 
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2. Patent growth and patent thickets 
 
2.1. Increase of patents 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the intellectual property (IP) system in recent years is 
the ongoing worldwide increase of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in general,17 and of 
patents and patent applications in particular.18 At first sight, life sciences is a field with a 
very high volume of patents and patent applications. On closer inspection, a more 
nuanced picture arises: in Europe biotechnology grew the fastest in 2014, taking the 8th 
place in the top ten of technical fields,19 while applications in pharmaceuticals dropped 
significantly for the second year in a row, but still taking the 10th place in the top ten of 
technical fields.20 
 
The overall growth of patents has been attributed to several factors. First and foremost, 
the increase of patents has been said to be caused by technological complexity.21 
Complex technology sectors are characterized by the need to assemble multiple elements 
to develop a final product.22 These sectors are therefore more sensitive to this trend.23 A 
second cause is the growing importance of sequential technologies. Innovation across the 
economy is becoming more cumulative in nature, building on previous inventions and 
innovations.24 A third factor is the explosive growth in innovation in sectors like the ICT 
                                                 
17 As to IP applications, 2.35 million patent applications are estimated to have been filed worldwide in 
2012, representing an increase of 9.2% on 2011, which is the highest rate recorded in 18 years; utility 
model applications total 827,500, representing a growth of 23.4% on the previous year’s figures; the 
number of classes specified in trademark applications saw growth of 6%, reaching 6.58 million; lastly, the 
1.22 million industrial designs contained in applications grew by 17%, the highest growth on record (See 
WIPO IP Facts and Figures, WIPO, 2013, p. 4 (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_2013.pdf, last visited October 19, 
2015). As to IP rights in force, at 82 offices around the world 8.66 million patents were in force, 
representing 7.9% more than in 2011; a total of 1.87 million utility models were in force at the 45 offices 
that maintain these statistics; approximately 24 million trademark registrations were active at 74 offices 
worldwide; lastly, about 2.71 million industrial design registrations were in force at 76 offices (Ibidem, p. 
10). For more details and context, see Emerging Markets and the World Patent Order, F. M. Abbott, C.M. 
Correa & P. Drahos (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2013. 
18 As to European patent applications at the EPO their figure grew by 2.7% in 2014 to a record high of 
151.981 (see EPO Annual Report 2014, available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-
statistics/annual-report/2014/statistics.html, last visited October 26, 2015). 
19 With 5.905 applications in 2014 and an increase of 12,1% compared to 2013 (see EPO Annual Report 
2014, available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2014/statistics.html, 
last visited October 26, 2015). 
20 With still 5.270 applications in 2014 (see EPO Annual Report 2014, available at 
http://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2014/statistics.html, last visited 
October 26, 2015. 
21 B. H. Hall, ‘Exploring the Patent Explosion’ [2004] The Journal of Technology Transfer, 35-48. 
22 R. C. Levin, A.K. Klevorick, R.R. Nelson & S.G. Winter, ‘Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development’ [1987] 3 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 783. Also see D.L. Burk & 
M.A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It, Chicago-London, The University of 
Chicago Press [2009]. 
23 S. Woolman, E. Fishman & M. Fisher, ‘Evidence of patent thickets in complex biopharmaceutical 
technologies’ [2013] Idea - Journal of Law and Technology, 1-38. 
24 I. Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity. A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth. An independent report 
(Study commissioned by the UK Prime Minister in November 2010), 2011 (available at 
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and biotechnology industry. Dissenting voices suggest, however, that the rise of patents 
does not correspond to a dramatic increase in the overall levels of innovation at all.25 A 
fourth factor is said to be uncertainty in the legal system. Uncertainty in the patent system 
has a counter-intuitive effect: instead of using it less, firms are choosing to file for more 
patents, either to fend off perceived threats or to take advantage of the weakness in the 
system.26 
 
2.2. Patent thickets. Concept 
 
The burning question following from the brief statistical overview is, whether the 
increasing use of patent leads to patent thickets in the life sciences. Before embarking on 
this issue, let us first (re-)address the notion of IP thickets in general, and patent thickets 
in particular. 
 
With the ICT sector in mind, Merges cautioned for a possible IP thicket, defining such an 
IP thicket as “a tangled, twisted mass of intellectual property rights, which criss-cross the 
established walkways of commerce” and where progress requires “numerous contracts 
with multiple, independent right holders”.27 In the same sense, Shapiro spoke of “a dense 
web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through 
in order to actually commercialize new technology”.28 Ullrich resonated this approach 
where he argued that a patent thicket may be present when “the field is crowded by a 
large number of patents, with ownership being dispersed among many patentees, so that 
it becomes impossible for anyone to work naturally coherent pieces of the technology 
without first obtaining consent by many other patentees”.29 Carefully reading the various 
definitions suggests that a patent thicket is likely to emerge when a multitude of IP rights 
is held by multiple IP owners.30  
                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview-
finalreport.pdf, last visited October 19, 2015). 
25 J.E. Bessen & M.J. Meurer, Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put innovators at risk, 
Princeton University Press [2008]. 
26 Hargreaves [2011] footnote 24. 
27 R. P. Merges, ‘Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations’ [1996] 84 Calif. Law Rev. 1293-1393. Merges already introduced the “thickets” metaphor in 
this article: “Intellectual property experts, especially scholars, have responded to this burgeoning thicket of 
rights…” (p. 1386) and “This Article is aimed at providing conceptual guidance for those who need to 
traverse the new thicket of intellectual property rights. Each vine, each plant, standing in one’s path 
represents a distinct IPR owned by an individual. To pass through, one needs a license from each owner. 
Where a single right blocks the path, this is easy: a single licensing contract does the trick. Today, however, 
business people more often than not encounter a tangled, twisted mass of IPRs, which criss-cross the 
established walkways of commerce. Progress along this path does not come cheaply: rather, it requires 
numerous contracts with multiple, independent right holders.” (p. 1295). 
28 C. Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting’ in 
Innovation Policy and the Economy (Vol. I), E. Jaffe et al. (eds.), MIT Press, 2001, 119–150. 
29 H. Ullrich, ‘Gene Patents and Clearing Models. Some Comments from a Competition Law Perspective’, 
Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models, Geertrui Van Overwalle (ed.), Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 
339-350. 
30 Cf. EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board, Report on Patent Thickets, Leuven, 26 September 
2012 (available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/esab/workshops.html, last visited October 21, 2015). 
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These definitions are unsatisfactory, for two reasons. First, the definitions do not clarify 
whether an IP thicket is present when the IP rights are numerous, or whether an IP thicket 
appears when the many IP rights at stake are also essential. More recently, some 
observers have indicated that a patent thicket is really present if there is a “critical mass 
of essential patent holders with a critical mass of essential patents”.31 In line with 
previous writings, we take the view that a patent thicket refers to a multitude of essential, 
patents which are held by a multitude of patent owners.32 
Second, the definitions mix up the problem of fragmentation and overlap. The problem of 
fragmentation of essential patents revolves around “divided entitlements among 
complements”33 (see Figure 1), which can occur either horizontally or vertically. 
Horizontal fragmentation occurs if patents cover different pieces that must be integrated 
into a product and vertical fragmentation takes place if patents cover different steps in a 
cumulative innovation process.34 Scholars point to the risk of bargaining breakdown 
whenever the development of a product requires permission from the owners of two or 
more inputs.35 In contrast, the problem of overlap points to a closely related albeit 
different problem. Multiple patents often cover the same ground, as different parties may 
be able to lay claim to the same subject matter technologies or to aspects of the same 
technology.36 (see Figure 1). Like the fragmentation problem, the overlap problem has 
the potential to prevent all parties from making a final product that incorporates multiple 
inventions. But where the fragmentation problem focuses on the need to aggregate 
dispersed property rights and the difficulty of assembling those fragments into a coherent 
product, the overlap problem suggests that patents should be phrased narrower than they 
are, so that the problem of overlapping scope will not arise. However, even with such 
narrower, non-overlapping patents, a fragmentation problem may persist. So, both 
fragmentation and overlap may inhibit a swift assembly of patents and give rise to an 
anti-commons problem. 
 
                                                 
31 L. A. Horn, ‘The MPEG LA® Licensing Model. What Problem Does It Solve in Biopharma and 
Genetics’, in Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models, G. Van Overwalle (ed.), Cambridge, CUP, 
2009, 33-41. In the same sense, J.A. Goldstein, ‘Critical Analysis of Patent Pools’, in Gene Patents and 
Collaborative Licensing Models, G. Van Overwalle (ed.), Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 50-60. 
32 In the same sense, G. von Graevenitz, S. Wagner & D. Harhoff, ‘How to measure patent thickets – A 
novel approach’, 111 Economics Letters, Issue 1, April 2011, 6–9, characterizing a patent thicket as 
involving (1) multiple patents or patent applications on (2) the same, similar, or complementary 
technologies, (3) held by different parties. 
33 D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’, Minnesota Public Law Research Paper No. 
03-11 and UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 135 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=431360, 
last visited October 21, 2015). A similar – correct – distinction between fragmentation and overlap can be 
found at D. Krauspenhaar, Liability Rules in Patent Law. A Legal and Economic Analysis, Berlin-
Heidelberg, Springer [2015] 53 ff. 
34 Burk & Lemley, footnote 33. 
35 Burk & Lemley, footnote 33. 
36 Burk & Lemley, footnote 33. Also see Bessen, & Meurer, 2008, footnote 25. 
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Figure 1. Distinction between patent fragmentation (patent thicket) and patent overlap 
 
2.3. Patent thickets in the life sciences? 
 
Within the life sciences sector, the debate on patent thickets kicked off in the sector of 
human biotechnology with the paper from Heller and Eisenberg.37 Our initial empirical 
research, assessing the potentially blocking effect of gene patents in Europe and in the 
US, provided a basis to tune down the alarming tone of the debate in genetics.38 More 
recent empirical research confirms our findings. First, a survey, interrogating technology 
players in the medical biotechnology field in Europe and Australia, does not provide 
further evidence of the existence of a vast patent thicket in medical biotechnology.39 Only 
25% of the respondents in the sample perceived the encountered number of third party 
patent rights as a substantial obstacle in their organisation’s path to research, product 
development and/or the provision of (clinical testing) services. Therefore, it is not 
possible to conclude from this data that a patent thicket really exists in medical 
biotechnology in Europe. Second, a worldwide patent claim study in the field of genetics, 
puts the anti-commons theory associated with gene patent claims into perspective as well, 
and substantiates that the risk that gene patent claims could impede access to a broad 
range of common genetic tests is mainly a North American problem (with some parallels 
in Japan).40 Third, a recent study provides no further evidence of an emerging anti-
commons in drug discovery, either.41 Last but not least, the suggestion that a thicket 
might emerge in whole genome sequencing, has lately been severely questioned.42 
 
The debate on patent thickets also emerged in the context of agricultural biotechnology. 
Concerns were expressed in the field of molecular breeding, with the Golden Rice 
                                                 
37 Heller & Eisenberg [1998] footnote 5. 
38 See Huys et al. [2009] footnote 14. 
39 See E. Van Zimmeren, S. Vanneste & G. Van Overwalle, Patent Licensing in Medical Biotechnology in 
Europe: A Role for Collaborative Licensing Strategies?, Leuven, Academic Cooperative Publishers 
(ACCO), 2011, 145 p. 
40 See J. Liddicoat, T. Whitton & D. Nicol, ‘Are the gene-patent storm clouds dissipating? A global 
snapshot’ [2015] 33 Nature Biotechnology, 347-352. The results from J. Liddicoat et al. provide evidence 
that the likelihood that the specific set of patents identified by Huys et al. [2009] footnote 14, could impede 
genetic testing on a global scale is remote, because many of those patents are not currently in force in 
countries other than the US. 
41 J. Nielsen, D. Nicol, J. Liddicoat, ‘Sharing the Burden in Australian Drug Discovery and Development: 
Collaborative Trends in Translational Research’ [2014] Intellectual Property Quarterly, 181, 209. 
42 W. Nicholson Price II, ‘Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole-Genome Sequencing 
and Personalized Medicine Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole-Genome 
Sequencing and Personalized Medicine’ [2012] 33 Cardozo Law Review. 
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technology as a poster child story, said to be covered by some 70 patents.43 Concerns 
were also voiced in the context of conventional plant breeding in view of the exponential 
growth of patents claiming native plant traits.44 It was argued that the need to assemble 
multiple traits in one plant variety may well lead to a patent thicket, resulting in restricted 
access to genetic variation.45 Access to variation is essential for breeders for the 
development of new plants and food security in the long run.46 Some empirical work has 
been carried out to investigate the emergence of a patent thicket in agriculture,47 and 
some recent experiences seem to signal that the problem is non-existing,48 but broader 
patent landscaping studies would be welcome to confirm or deny the existence of a patent 
thicket in the agricultural field. 
 
Overlooking the past and present, there does not seem to be wide and strong evidence 
that the rise of patents in the life sciences leads to devastating patent thickets, frustrating 
the use of technology and ultimately leading to a tragedy of the anti-commons.49 So, may 
be time has come to put this alluring metaphor, which intensely dominated the 
(academic) debate for the last 15 years, to rest in the future. 
 
3. Patent pools and clearinghouses. Concept and present-day working examples 
 
Under the assumption that an anti-commons problem might occur, various strategies have 
been suggested to mitigate the alleged hindering effect of patent thickets and facilitate 
access over the past decade. Several private and public ordering approaches have been 
put forward to deal with the perceived quagmire of patent rights recognizing the 
(positive) function of the patent system to serve as an incentive and focusing on remedies 
to tackle some of its (potential, negative) effects (see Table 1).50 Our research focused on 
the role of contractual, collaborative rights organizations in mediating the use of patents 
in the life sciences. 
                                                 
43 See G. Graff and D. Zilberman, ‘Towards an Intellectual Property Clearinghouse for Agribiotechnology’ 
[2001] 3 IP Technol. Today, 1–12; G. Graff, S.E. Cullen, K. J. Bradford, D. Zilberman, & A. B. Bennett, 
‘The Public–Private Structure of Intellectual Property Ownership in Agricultural Biotechnology’ [2003] 21 
Nature Biotechnol., 989–995. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 N. Louwaars, H. Dons, G. Van Overwalle, H. Raven, A. Arundel, D. Eaton & A. Nelis, Breeding 
Business. The Future of Plant Breeding in the Light of Developments in Patent Rights and Plant Breeder’s 
Rights (Study on request of the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality), 
Wageningen, Centre for Genetic Resources (CGN) – Wageningen University and Research Centre, 2009, 
(CGN Rapport 2009-14 EN), 27 and the references cited there (available at 
http://www.wageningenur.nl/nl/show/Breeding-Business.htm, last visited October 20, 2015. 
47 Louwaars et al [2009] footnote 46. The report points to the development of large patent portfolios of 
more or less overlapping claims. 
48 Some contra-indication for the existence of a patent thicket for native traits can be deduced from an 
elucidation on the e-licensing platform from Syngenta, see further Section 4.1. (and footnote 114). 
49 Also see B. Depoorter & S. Vanneste, ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Experimental Evidence 
of Anticommons Tragedies’ [2004] 3 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 1. 
50 For more details, see ‘Section 1. Introduction’ of the present chapter. 
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Mechanisms to facilitate 
access and use 
of patent protected subject 
matter 
 
Public ordering 
solutions 
 
Narrowing down patentable 
subject matter 
Strengthening patentability 
requirements 
Introduction wider research 
exemption and breeder’s 
exemption in patent law 
Private 
ordering 
solutions 
Conventional Bilateral licences 
Cross licences 
New Patent pool 
Clearinghouse 
Open source 
Table 1. Models facilitating access and use (based on G. Van Overwalle [2009], footnote 15) 
 
3.1. Patent pools 
 
Before discussing past and present patent pools in the life sciences field, let us first 
succinctly bring to mind the notion of patent pools, for the non-informed reader. 
 
3.1.1. Concept 
 
The term ‘patent pool’ has acquired different meanings.51 In its widest sense a patent pool 
refers to a loose collection of patents held by different patent owners. In a more narrow 
sense, a patent pool points to an agreement between two or more patent owners to license 
one or more of their patents to one another, and to license them as a package to third 
parties who are willing to pay the royalties that are associated with the license. Licenses 
are provided to the licensee, either directly by the patentee, or indirectly through a new 
entity that is specifically set up for the administration of the pool (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparative illustration of the different licenses needed in the absence or presence of a patent 
pool. P1–P4 represents the patent holders. L1–L4 represents the licensees. In the absence of a patent pool, 
licensees have to enter into negotiations with all the patent holders, which is a time consuming and 
expensive process. By contrast, in the presence of a patent pool licensees turn to the patent pool for 
                                                 
51 See G. Van Overwalle [2010] footnote 15 and the references cited there. 
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acquiring the rights as one package, which results in simplification and a significant reduction of 
transaction costs.52 
 
Patent pools may have significant benefits.53 In a nutshell, pools may eliminate stacking 
licenses, reduce licensing transaction costs through the introduction of a system of ‘one 
stop licensing’ for non-member licensees, decrease patent litigation and contribute to the 
institutionalized exchange of technical information that is not covered by patents, through 
a mechanism for sharing technical information relating to the patented technology, which 
would otherwise be kept as a trade secret. As well as providing a possible solution to the 
problem of patent thickets, the creation of a patent pool might also stimulate funding for 
research and development, benefiting all partners in the pool. 
Patent pools might also carry some risks. In brief, pools might shield invalid patents and 
entail inequitable remunerations. Additionally, patent pools might cover for a cartel and, 
subsequently, have anti-competitive effects. 
 
Patent pools are not new, having been used occasionally but regularly since the 
nineteenth century.54 The first licensing pool was established in 1856 among members of 
the sewing machine industry. A further prominent example of an early patent pool is the 
1917 aircraft pool that was formed between almost all US aircraft manufacturers. This 
patent pool was crucial to the US government entering World War I. 
In the 1990s the patent pool model gained wide interest in the ICT-sector and several 
pools with worldwide coverage were formed. In contrast to the early patent pools, those 
modern pools usually cover relevant patents for one particular standard, rather than 
covering all patents of an industry. Further, their licensing rules are more complex than 
those of the early licensing pools. A key example of a modern patent pool in the ICT area 
is the pool related to the digital video compression standard known as MPEG-2. Another 
trendsetting patent pool of the 1990s is the DVD pool. 
 
3.1.2. Life sciences 
 
Although transplanting the pool concept from ICT to the life sciences was unlikely to be 
straightforward and was expected to be more than simple cutting and pasting, various 
patent pools have been set up in this field over the last years.  
 
A patent pool in the health care field which gained wide attention is the Medicines Patent 
Pool (MPP).55 (see Table 2). Founded in 2010, the MPP is a voluntary, UN-backed pool 
that aims to lower the prices of HIV medicines in low and middle income countries and 
facilitate the development of better-adapted HIV medicines, such as simplified ‘fixed-
dose combinations’ and special formulations for children.56 The MPP pool is a post-
product pool, covering fragmented patents for a few particular diseases, rather than a pre-
                                                 
52 Reprinted from B. Verbeure et al. [2006] footnote 15, at 115 and 116. 
53 See G. Van Overwalle [2010] footnote 15 and the references cited there. 
54 See G. Van Overwalle [2010] footnote 15 and the references cited there. 
55 See http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/ (last visited October 20, 2015). The author of the present 
chapter acted as an advisor to the Extended Expert Consultation elaborating the UNITAID Medicines 
Patent Pool Initiative at the time of its establishment in 2008. 
56 See http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/ (last visited October 20, 2015). 
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product platform covering all patents of an industry.57 MPP negotiates licenses with 
relevant patent holders and then sublicenses the patented medicines to generics 
manufacturers to develop, produce and sell medicines in agreed-upon developing 
countries under well-defined terms (see Figure 3).58 The licenses are not provided 
directly by the patentee, but indirectly through the MPP which is specifically set up for 
the administration of the pool.59 
 
Figure 3. MPP: an indirect licensing pool60 
 
A less successful biomedical patent pool was the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) corona virus pool, supported by the World Health Organization (WHO).61 Even 
though the relevant patent holders had been identified and agreement had officially been 
gained by the signing of a letter of intent, the pool is no longer actively being pursued, 
because with no further outbreaks of SARS, the economic driver for the formation of 
such a pool has been removed.62 
 
An instructive patent pool in the field of agriculture is the Golden Rice pool. The 
scientist Potrykus succeeded in genetically enriching rice grains with β-carotene 63 and 
                                                 
57 Cf. B. Verbeure [2009] footnote 15. 
58 At present, MPP holds licenses for 12 antiretrovirals from six patent holders, and collaborates with 10 
generic partners who have distributed 2.18 billion doses of HIV medicines in 117 countries. See Medicines 
Patent Pool, Working Today for the Treatments of Tomorrow. Annual Report 2014 (available at 
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/wp-content/uploads/MPP_Annual_Report_2014_web.pdf, last visited 
October 20, 2015). 
59 The MPP initiative also encompasses the MPP Patent Status Database collecting data on patented HIV 
medicines, formulations and combinations (See http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/patent-data/ (last 
visited October 7, 2015). 
60 See http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/ (last visited October 7, 2015). 
61 See C. E. Correa, ‘IP Fragmentation and Patent Pools: the SARS Case’, in Gene Patents and 
Collaborative Licensing Models, G. Van Overwalle (ed.), Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 42-49; J. Simon, 
‘Dealing with Patent Fragmentation: The SARS Patent Pool as a Model’, in Gene Patents and Public 
Health, G. Van Overwalle (ed.), Brussel, Bruylant, 2007, 115-120; J. H. M. Simon, E. Claassen, E., C. E. 
Correa, A. D. M. E. Osterhaus, ‘Managing severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) intellectual property 
rights: the possible role of patent pooling’ [2005] Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 707-710. 
62 E. van Zimmeren et al. [2011] footnote 15. 
63 P. Beyer, S. Al-Babili, X. Ye, P. Lucca, P. Schaub, R. Welsch & I. Potrykus, ‘Golden Rice: Introducing 
the Beta-Carotene Biosynthesis Pathway into Rice Endosperm by Genetic Engineering to Defeat Vitamin A 
Deficiency’ [2002], 132 The Journal of Nutrition, 506. 
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wanted to transfer the Golden Rice materials to developing countries for further breeding 
in order to introduce the trait into local varieties that are consumed in these countries. The 
key patent holders were approached and a voluntarily agreement was reached that 
allowed Potrykus to grant licenses with the assistance of the intermediate legal entity 
Greenovation, acting as an administrator.64 Conceived as a post-product pool covering 
the essential patents to produce Golden Rice, it is not clear why the pool is not yet up and 
running at present. Insiders suggest that this might relate to the long and cumbersome 
marketing authorization procedure, and even more so, to the current opposition in civil 
society to embrace genetically modified plants.65 
 
3.2. Patent clearinghouses 
 
Before setting out on a tour d’horizon (re)assessing the objectives and performance of 
past and present day patent clearinghouses in the life sciences area, let us first briefly 
recall the notion of clearinghouses in general, and patent clearinghouses in particular, for 
the non-expert reader. 
 
3.2.1. Concept 
 
The term ‘clearinghouse’ is derived from banking institutions and refers to the 
mechanism by which cheques and bills are exchanged among member banks to transfer 
only the net balances in cash. Nowadays the concept has acquired a broader meaning that 
refers to any mechanism by which providers and users of goods, services and/or 
information are matched (see Figure 4).66 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparative illustration of the different licenses needed in the absence or presence of a 
clearinghouse. P1–P4 represents the patent holders. L1–L4 represents the licensees. In the absence of a 
                                                 
64 See http://www.goldenrice.org/index.php (last visited November 17, 2015). Also see G. Graff & D. 
Zilberman [2001] footnote 43; G. Graff et al. [2003] footnote 43, at 989; R. Parish & R. Jargosch, R., 
‘Using the Industry Model to Create Physical Science Patent Pools among Academic Institutions’ [2003] 
15 J. Ass’n U. Tech. Managers 65 
65 It has been argued that NGO’s oppose the marketing of Golden Rice. However, Dr. Moore, co-founder of 
Greenpeace, has undergone a change of heart and now supports the Golden Rice initiative, see 
http://www.allowgoldenricenow.org/ (last visited November 18, 2015). 
66 See G. Van Overwalle [2010] footnote 15 and the references cited there.  
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clearinghouse, licensees have to enter into negotiations with all the patent holders. In the presence of a 
clearinghouse, licensees turn to the clearinghouse entity for acquiring the rights. 
 
Clearinghouses facilitate access to patented innovations by centralizing scattered patent 
rights. Based on the various functions a clearinghouse may fulfill, four main types can be 
distinguished.67 Two models merely provide access to (patented or otherwise protected) 
information: the information clearinghouse and the technology exchange clearinghouse. 
Two more elaborate models provide access and also standardize the use of the (patented) 
inventions: the standardized licenses clearinghouse and the royalty collection 
clearinghouse.  
The information clearinghouse provides a mechanism for exchanging technical 
information and/or information that is related to the IP status of that information. 
Examples of information clearinghouses include general patent search sites, either freely 
accessible, such as Espacenet from the European Patent Office (EPO)68, or fee-based, like 
Thomson.69 A new initiative is Lens,70 offering a free, fully text-searchable database of 
patents worldwide, integrated with scholarly and technical literature along with 
regulatory and business data. Lens is established with the support of Cambia and the 
Queensland University of Technology. 
The technology exchange clearinghouse is inspired by the internet-based business-to-
business (B2B) model and provides an information service that lists the available 
technologies to allow technology owners and/or buyers to initiate negotiations for a 
license. Additionally, it may provide more comprehensive mediating and managing 
facilities. It is important to underline that actual access to the patented inventions is not 
usually granted by the technology exchange clearinghouse, but by the individual patent 
holder after one-to-one licensing negotiations have taken place with the licensee. These 
negotiations are, however, based on the information on the inventions which was 
provided by the clearinghouse. Although the technology-exchange clearinghouse model 
is generally cheap to maintain and generates only low operating costs, it might be 
difficult to bring together the critical mass of patents that would be needed to turn 
platforms of this type into useful tools. 
The standardized licenses clearinghouse provides access to and standardizes licenses for 
the use of protected inventions. A clearinghouse may offer ‘standard’ licenses. ‘Standard’ 
by no means signifies ‘one size fits all’ or absence of variability. ‘Standard’ means a 
preset license with options that vary according to the broad features of the rights. 
Standard licenses can be differentiated as to the nature of the user, the objective of the 
use and the profile of the eventual product to be developed by the licensee. The access to 
licenses can be arranged by a portal through which licensors and licensees can use a 
simple interface, with drop-down menus and standard questions, enabling the creation of 
a customized agreement, tailored to fit the large variety of circumstances in patent 
                                                 
67 See G. Van Overwalle [2010] footnote 15 and the references cited there. The fifth type mentioned in Van 
Overwalle [2010] more in particular the open source clearinghouse, will not be discussed here. 
68 See http://worldwide.espacenet.com/ (last visited October 20, 2015). 
69 See http://info.thomsoninnovation.com/en/features/search (last visited October 20, 2015). 
70 See https://www.lens.org/lens/ (last visited October 20, 2015). The Lens initiative grew out of the Patent 
Lens initiative, an initiative established alongside the open source BiOS project 
(http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/home.html (last visited October 20, 2015) within the framework from 
Cambia (http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html (last visited October 20, 2015). 
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licensing Replacing the tailored license by a (customized) standard license agreement 
would diminish the bargaining costs for individual licenses. A well-known example of a 
standardized license clearinghouse is Creative Commons (CC).71 CC has already been in 
operation for a couple of years facilitating the use of copyrighted material, such as music, 
movies, photos, books, course materials, scientific and medical literature by way of 
standardized, simplified. 
The royalty collection clearinghouse comprises all the functions of the information 
clearinghouse, the technology exchange clearinghouse and the standardized licenses 
scheme. In addition to these functions, the royalty collection clearinghouse sets up a 
mechanism to collect license fees from users on behalf of the patent holders in return for 
the access to and use of the inventions. The patent holder is reimbursed by the 
clearinghouse pursuant to a set allocation formula, which has been negotiated 
beforehand. Classical examples of royalty collection clearinghouses include copyright 
societies such as ASCAP (the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers 72) or other national agencies.73 
 
3.2.2. Life sciences 
 
Initial writings focused on patent pools for ICT and copyright collecting societies for 
music. For quite some time now, the academic debate has been taken further and has 
examined those models for use in the life sciences. 
 
Information clearinghouses 
 
A rather new and well appreciated initiative in the agricultural sector is Information and 
Transparency On-line (PINTO) which has been created with the aim of improving 
transparency regarding the patent status of plant varieties. Although there are many 
publicly accessible patent databases, this project provides the link between a plant variety 
and a patent, information which is currently not available elsewhere.74 
 
Technology exchange clearinghouses 
 
Specific health care technology exchange platforms have existed for quite some time. A 
typical example is Pharmalicensing,75 an online platform providing online partnering 
support that enables companies in the biopharmaceutical and biomedical industry to find 
licensing partners and conclude licensing contracts. 
A new kid on the block in the health care sector is WIPO Re:Search, an online platform 
set up under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 
                                                 
71 See http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited, October 20, 2015). 
72 See http://www.ascap.com/ (last visited, October 20, 2015). 
73 E.g. Sabam in Belgium (http://www.sabam.be/ last visited, October 20, 2015). 
74 http://pinto.euroseeds.eu/ (last visited October 12, 2015). The main feature of PINTO is the search tool 
function which allows users to look through the database on the basis of a number of search criteria such as 
variety denomination, species, patent number, patent holder or keyword. 
75 See http://www.worldpharmalicensing.com/ (last visited October 7, 2015). 
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collaboration with BIO Ventures for Global Health (BVGH).76 The primary objective of 
WIPO Re:Search is to catalyze new research and development for neglected tropical 
diseases (NTDs), malaria and tuberculosis. For achieving this, WIPO Re:Search has 
established an independent administrator entity, the so-called Partnership Hub managed 
by a Partnership Hub Administrator (in casu BVGH) where users can obtain additional, 
confidential information about any patent.77 (See Figure 5). Patent holders grant users 
royalty-free non-exclusive licenses to their IP (including access to know-how and data, 
for research and development), but access is subject to individually negotiated licensing 
agreements between patent holders and users.78 Although the Partnership Hub can 
facilitate research agreements, all discussions on concluding a licensing agreement and 
any preliminary arrangements (confidentiality and other types of agreements) are handled 
directly by the patent holder and potential user.79 So, WIPO Re:Search is a cooperative, 
voluntary, pre-product technology exchange arrangement between IP holders and users, 
united by a common set of principles and objectives, but each acting on their own. WIPO 
Re:Search indeed creates “an open innovation platform through which public and private 
sector entities can share IP”, be it on individually negotiated terms.80 
 
 
 
Figure 5. WIPO Re:Search: a technology partnering clearinghouse 
[http://www.bvgh.org/Portals/0/Reports/2012_2013_wipo_rs_storybook.pdf,  
last visited November 18, 2015] 
 
Specific agricultural clearinghouses include Public Intellectual Property Resource 
(PIPRA), a voluntary collaboration between universities, foundations and non-profit 
                                                 
76 See WIPO Re:Search. Sharing Innovation in the Fight Against Neglected Tropical Diseases. Guiding 
Principles, 2011 (available at http://www.wipo.int/research/en/, last visited, October 12 2015). The initial 
pool (http://www.ntdpool.org/, discussed in E. van Zimmeren et al. [2011] footnote 15) is no longer active. 
77 For more details, see Annex 3 of the WIPO Guiding Principles, footnote 67. 
78 For more details, see Annex 3 of the WIPO Guiding Principles, footnote 67. 
79 At the close of 2014, 82 collaborations were in place between members, including 38 established in 
2014, see WIPO Re:Search, 2014 Partnership Hub Report. Catalyzing Partnerships for Global Health 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/research/en/docs/bvgh_research_report_2014.pdf, last 
visited October 12, 2015). It is further interesting to note that providers will not make any claims to rights 
in new IP, materials or derivatives of materials generated by a user under a license agreement made 
pursuant to membership in this WIPO Re:Search, but may require such user not to assert such new IPRs 
against the provider. For products resulting from licenses through the Consortium, all users are encouraged 
to provide licenses for these products on a royalty-free basis for use and sale in all LDCs. 
80 Ibidem. 
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research institutions to make dispersed agricultural technologies more easily available for 
humanitarian use.81 Much has changed over the decade since PIPRA was first conceived. 
There has been a movement toward viewing IP less as a block to innovation and more as 
a high, but surmountable, transaction cost; IP-related transaction costs have been put into 
perspective amidst other costs of developing genetically modified crops (including 
regulatory, technical, marketing, and political issues).82 Since its inception, PIPRA 
moved away from identifying their core function as a patent clearinghouse and toward a 
model providing services focused on research and analysis, agreement negotiation and 
drafting, lab services and international workshops. 
A totally new clearing initiative in the agricultural sector is the International Licensing 
Platform for vegetable plant breeding (ILP Vegetable), voluntarily launched in November 
2014 by a group of breeding companies.83 The main objective of IPL Vegetable is to 
guarantee worldwide access to patents that cover crucial vegetable plant traits that are 
currently covered by patent claims by ILP Vegetable member companies.84 Central in the 
set-up of IPL Vegetable is the principle of membership and reciprocity: the willingness to 
become a member and put one’s patents on the platform is a key condition to be allowed 
access to all patents on the platform85 (see Figure 6). The ILP Vegetable mechanism, 
provides an information service listing available patents to allow technology owners 
and/or buyers to initiate one-to-one bilateral license negotiations. Indeed, license 
negotiations are first conducted on a bilateral basis and are expected to take place on ‘fair 
and reasonable’ terms.86 During the bilateral negotiations, members may choose to make 
use of the standard license provided for by ILP Vegetable. If bilateral negotiations fail 
and members do not reach a consensus within a period of three months after the start, ILP 
provides comprehensive mediating facilities. The case can be submitted to the secretary 
of the ILP Vegetable and later on to a group of independent experts, who will take a 
decision based on a so-called baseball procedure.87 
                                                 
81 See R. C. Atkinson, R. N. Beachy, G. Conway, F. A. Cordova, M. A. Fox, K. A. Holbrook, D. F. 
Klessig, R. L. McCormick, P. M. McPherson, H. R. Rawlings III, R. Rapson, L. N. Vanderhoef, J. D. 
Wiley, C. E. Young, ‘Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management’ [2003] 301, Science 
174-175. Also see A. B. Bennett & S. Boettiger, ‘The Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture. 
A Standard License Public Sector Clearinghouse for Agricultural IP’, in Gene Patents and Collaborative 
Licensing Models, G. Van Overwalle (ed.), Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 135-142. 
82 See http://www.pipra.org/ (last visited October 21, 2015). 
83 Eleven breeding companies were the founding fathers of ILP Vegetable, comprising both listed 
companies and family businesses from Switzerland, Germany, Japan, France and the Netherlands (namely 
(Agrisemen, Bayer, Bejo, Enza, Holland-Select, Limagrain, Limgroup, Pop Vriend, Rijk Zwaan, Syngenta 
and Takii)v(see http://www.ilp-vegetable.org/about-ilp and http://www.ilp-vegetable.org/members/ (last 
visited October 14 2015). 
84 See http://www.ilp-vegetable.org/ (last visited October 14, 2015). The latest version of the patents 
offered for licensing dates from October 5, 2015 and can be found in the Patent Register (see 
http://www.ilp-vegetable.org/patents/, last visited October 14, 2015). 
85 Membership is open to all interested parties, regardless of whether they own patents or not. The annual 
membership fees are based on the number of full term employees of the company and its affiliates in the 
year membership is applied for (see http://www.ilp-vegetable.org/about-ilp and http://www.ilp-
vegetable.org/members/ (last visited October 14 2015). 
86 See http://www.ilp-vegetable.org/patents/ (last visited October 14, 2015). 
87 In concreto the procedure unfolds as follows. Both non-agreeing members will submit their license fee 
proposal to the secretary of the ILP Vegetable. After receiving figures from both members, the secretary 
exchanges the two proposals between the two members involved with the possibility to come to an 
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Figure 6. International Licensing Platform (ILP) Vegetable 
 
Standardized clearinghouses 
 
Standardized clearinghouses in the life sciences are still relatively young. Science 
Commons is an initiative expanding the use of standardized Creative Commons (CC) 
licenses to scientific and technical research.88 A project within Science Commons which 
is slowly emerging is the Biological Materials Transfer (BMT) Project. The BMT Project 
aims at “building the clearinghouse for research tools”.89 A first initiative under the BMT 
Project is the Biological Materials Transfer Agreement (BMTA) Project which aims at 
developing standard, modular contracts to lower the costs of transferring physical 
biological materials such as DNA, cell lines, model animals, antibodies, etc. among non-
profit institutions as well as between non-profit and for profit institutions.90 Standard 
terms are being developed with regard to the scope of the use of the material 
(commercial/non-commercial, etc.), but standard terms do not seem to be available (as 
yet) with regard to license fees. A second initiative under the BMT Project relates to a 
prototype project called GreenXchange, fueling so-called public patent licenses. Under 
the GreenXchange project, the goal is to encourage patent holders to make their patent 
                                                                                                                                                 
agreement within three weeks. If no agreement can be reached, the decision is referred to a group of 
independent experts, who will choose the most reasonable proposal. Subsequently, a Standard License 
Agreement including the chosen proposal will be executed. It is argued that this system encourages both 
parties to propose reasonable positions, because an unreasonable position will be rejected in favour of a 
more reasonable proposal. The cost for the baseball arbitration must be paid by the member whose proposal 
has not been selected by the independent experts (see http://www.ilp-vegetable.org/about-ilp/licensing-
system/ and http://www.ilp-vegetable.org/q-and-a/q7.html (last visited October 14, 2015). 
88 Science Commons was recently integrated with Creative Commons, see  
https://creativecommons.org/science/ (last visited October 14, 2015). 
89 See http://sciencecommons.org/projects/licensing/ (last visited October 9, 2015). 
90 See http://sciencecommons.org/projects/licensing/details/ (last visited October 14, 2015); also see 
http://mta.sciencecommons.org/agreements/sc-ou/2.0/ (last visited October 14, 2015). Also see T. Nguyen, 
‘The Science Commons Material Transfer Agreement Project. A Standard License Clearinghouse?’ in 
Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models, G. Van Overwalle (ed.), Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 143-
50. 
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portfolio available for licensing through public license offers, where the offer is openly 
and can be accepted by anyone on a non-discriminatory basis and without additional 
negotiation,91 in other words where it is expected that anyone who can agree to it is 
empowered to accept without further negotiation.92 However, practical details on how 
this mission statement will be implemented are lacking at present. Or is this initiative 
rather fading out than coming up?93 
 
Another rather new initiative in the health care sector is set up by MPEG LA, renown 
administrator of patent pools,94 who established a molecular diagnostics licensing 
clearinghouse in April 2010, known as Librassay or ‘licensing supermarket’.95 
Librassay’s aim is to aggregate patent rights for existing and emerging tests that could 
lead to personalized treatment (e.g. in relation to cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, 
neurological disorders and various hereditary conditions such as hearing loss) and to 
license those patents non-exclusively for diagnostic use at preset annual fees per patent 
and royalty rates.96 Patent owners can enter into a commitment to provide their patents in 
the diagnostic field to Librassay for a minimum of 5 years. Patent owners retain rights for 
research, education and drug development carried out by them or on their behalf. Patent 
owners have the option of delegating the responsibility and costs associated with patent 
maintenance fees and with continuing patent prosecution to MPEG LA. MPEG LA 
assumes the cost for any enforcement actions that might be necessary based on the 
interests of the patent owners and licensees enrolled in the supermarket. Further research 
is needed to assess whether Librassay covers the patents most relevant for personal 
medicine.97 
 
On the agricultural front, recently some agriculture companies established e-licensing 
platforms. One such platform has been set up by Syngenta.98 The Syngenta platform 
offers breeders and research institutes guaranteed access to a wide portfolio of patented 
native traits and enabling technologies present in their commercial vegetable varieties.99 
A key feature of the platform is royalty free access for licensed traits during development 
and breeding of new varieties and royalty payment at preset terms if the newly-developed 
                                                 
91 See https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/CC_Public_Patent_License (last visited October 14, 2015). 
92 See http://sciencecommons.org/projects/patent-licenses/ (last visited October 14, 2015). 
93 This observation was uttered by a former CC collaborator during the Joseph Kohler Symposium on 
‘Intellectual Property on Plants’ at the Humboldt University in Berlin, October 30, 2015, where the author 
presented a paper on this issue. 
94 http://www.mpegla.com/ (last visited October 21, 2015). 
95 https://www.librassay.com/ (last visited October 21, 2015). Also see E. van Zimmeren et al. [2011] 
footnote 15. 
96 See Librassay® Patent Portfolio License Summary, September 12, 2013 (available at 
https://www.librassay.com/RequestLicense.aspx, last visited October 27, 2015). In sum, the “basic annual 
fee” amounts to 2.500$ per licensed patent up to a maximum of 12.500$ per year. The royalty follows a 
preset formula (royalty rate x income from sales (“collectibles”) of a given royalty bearing product or use) 
and a schedule of royalty rates based on patent count. 
97 Personal communication Isabelle Huys, November 4 2015. 
98 See http://www3.syngenta.com/global/e-licensing/en/e-licensing/Pages/home.aspx (last visited October 
20, 2015). 
99 See http://www3.syngenta.com/global/e-licensing/en/e-licensing/Catalog/Pages/Catalog.aspx (last visited 
October 20, 2015). 
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and commercialized variety contains the patented trait.100 In principle more favorable 
conditions than the preset ones are not available by contacting outside of the e-licensing 
system. However, bilateral agreements may be used in specific cases when a deal entails 
more than a monetary retribution.101 The Syngenta initiative is an impressive effort to 
establish a fully fletched standardized licensing platform in the sense that it organizes 
access to patented subject matter on in advance defined and standardized terms and that it 
provides access to and standardizes licenses for the use of protected inventions. It 
remains to be seen to what extent users consider the royalty setting fair and reasonable, 
and whether the platform is effectively used. 
Another agricultural e-licensing platform is set up by Enza Zaden.102 The Enza Zaden 
platform offers a selection of (trait) technologies and accompanying varieties, relating to 
lettuce, cucumber and melon.103 The standard terms include a non-exclusive, royalty-
bearing license to use the patented (native trait) technology, for research, breeding and 
commercial purposes.104 Unfortunately, details on the royalty terms are lacking,105 so it 
cannot be verified whether Enza is indeed a standardized licensing platform, offering 
access at predefined financial terms. 
 
Royalty collecting clearinghouses 
 
At present, no examples of a royalty collection clearinghouse seem exist in the field of 
the life sciences. The Global Bio-Collecting Society (GBS)106 was a praiseworthy attempt 
to design a royalty collection clearinghouse model in agriculture, but never moved 
beyond the conceptual stage. 
 
4. Present-day patent pools and clearinghouses. Critical assessment 
 
Amongst the many themes which have governed academic discourse on collaborative 
licensing over the last decade, three themes have been singled out here for further 
inquiry. More in particular, we will examine the objectives (See 4.1.), the institutional 
design (See 4.2.) and the impact on innovation (See 4.3.) of collaborative licensing 
                                                 
100 See http://www3.syngenta.com/global/e-licensing/en/e-licensing/About/Pages/About.aspx (last visited 
October 20, 2015). The procedure to license patented native traits and enabling technologies unfolds in four 
steps. In a first step users are invited to search the Syngenta catalog by accessing the e-license website. 
When a user clicks on a trait or technology of his choice, detailed information on the technical features, the 
standard financial terms, the patent status and the list of commercial Syngenta varieties that contain the 
patented native traits appear. Further steps include filling out the standard agreement. 
101 See http://www3.syngenta.com/global/e-licensing/en/e-
licensing/About/Pages/Frequentlyaskedquestions.aspx (last visited October 20, 2015). This has been 
confirmed by a participant from thee seed industry during the Joseph Kohler Symposium on ‘Intellectual 
Property on Plants’ at the Humboldt University in Berlin, October 30, 2015, where the author presented a 
paper relating to this issue. 
102 See http://www.enzazaden.com/elicensing/ (last visited October 20, 2015). 
103 See http://www.enzazaden.com/elicensing/catalog/ (last visited October 20, 2015). 
104 See http://www.enzazaden.com/elicensing/getlicence/ (last visited October 20, 2015). 
105 For further information and execution of a standard license agreement, interested parties are invited to 
contact Enza, see http://www.enzazaden.com/elicensing/getlicence/ (last visited October 20, 2015) 
106 P. Drahos, ‘Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-Collecting 
Society the Answer?’ [2000] 20 EIPR, 245. 
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mechanisms. These elements vary considerably between the patent pools and 
clearinghouses under study (see Table 2).107 
 
4.1. Changing objectives. Towards multi-purpose models 
 
From their creation as a response to emerging patent thickets, the direct goal of both 
patent pools and clearinghouses has been to facilitate access to protected creations and 
innovations by centralizing scattered patent rights.108 During the last decade, two 
tendencies can be witnessed, resulting in a movement away from this core objective.  
A first tendency is the worldwide upsurge of ‘patent aggregators’. Patent aggregation 
describes any activity where patents that were previously owned by a number of different 
parties, are brought under the control of a single actor or entity.109 Entities actively 
aggregating patents are usually said to include patent pools, patent brokers, practising 
entities and non-practising entities (patent monetisation entities).110 It has been suggested 
that many types of patent aggregators are beneficial and contribute to creating markets 
for technology, thus solving market inefficiencies and improving incentives to innovate; 
however, individual behaviour and specific services offered can have negative welfare 
implications and should be judged on a case-by-case basis.111 As many patent aggregator 
web sites and business models promoting on-line licensing of patents have unfolded 
during the last decade, collaborative licensing models such as patent pools and 
clearinghouses have refocused on providing additional services, going beyond the simple 
centralization of patent rights. Exemplary in this regard is PIPRA, who has moved away 
from simply offering patents, to providing IP analysis (offering broad landscapes or 
analyses focused on particular technologies), biotechnology resources (e.g. the PIPRA 
vector), drafting and negotiating agreements, research consortia support (including 
public-private partnerships), IP management workshops, commercialization strategies to 
improve technology delivery and IP policy analysis.112 A similar, widened, approach can 
be observed within Science Commons and the Biological Materials Transfer (BMT) 
Projects. 
                                                 
107 The interplay between collaborative licensing mechanisms and standards will not be reviewed here. The 
interested reader might care to consult K. Maskus and S. A. Merrill (eds), Patent Challenges for Standard-
Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from Information and Communication Technology, National 
Research Council (2013); E. van Zimmeren [2011] footnote 14, 16-17, 485 ff. 
108 See G. Van Overwalle [2010] footnote 15. 
109 See EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board (ESAB), Report on Patent aggregation and its 
impact on competition and innovation policy, Munich, 25 November 2014 (available at 
http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/esab/workshops.html, last visited October 23, 2015). Control 
essentially means the right to decide which party gets access to the patents and under what terms, Ibidem. 
Patent aggregators are usually distinguished from patent intermediaries. Patent intermediaries are 
organisations which match supply and demand of individual patents or patent portfolios, possibly in 
combination with technology or additional know-how, and facilitate patent-based transactions (See N. 
Ziegler, M. A. Bader & F. Ruther, Handbook External Patent Exploitation: Motives, Forms, the Role of 
Intermediaries and a Guideline, St. Gallen: ITEM-HSG, 2011 (available at http://www.bgw-sg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Handbook_CTI-IPotential_final1.pdf, last visited October 23, 2015). 
110 See EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board (ESAB), 2014, footnote 96. 
111 See EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board (ESAB), 2014, footnote 96. 
112 See PIPRA’s History and Changes over Time (available at http://www.pipra.org/about/, last visited 
October 23, 2015). 
  21
A second tendency is the growing interest in industry circles for potentially blocking 
single patents. A tragedy of the anti-commons may not only occur as a result of 
fragmentation or overlap of patents, but may also arise in case of the emergence of a 
single, so-called ‘blocking’ patent. A blocking patent refers to a patent covering (some or 
more) features which are essential for a certain activity or function.113 Some recent 
collaborative license initiatives bear witness of the aim to facilitate access to single, 
potentially blocking patents, rather than to collect scattered patent rights. Exemplary in 
this regard are the Syngenta e-licensing platform, the Enza initiative and, most 
prominently, the ILP Vegetable platform. ILP Vegetable recognizes that the major 
problem in the sector is not fragmentation or overlap, since “the number of patents 
available per species is often one only”.114 Rather, ILP Vegetable aims at providing 
guaranteed access to those single patents. 
 
Although collaborative models share a common direct goal – namely to facilitate access 
by centralizing scattered IP rights or, more recently, to provide guaranteed access to 
single patents – they may be fueled by different final motivations. Looking at their 
underlying rationale and ultimate objectives, two major models can be distinguished: 
market driven models and policy driven models. Market driven (‘push’) models follow a 
commercial scenario: usually voluntarily created by private, commercial actors (bottom 
up), they follow market rules (e.g. market price, reasonable license) in an attempt to cure 
an efficiency problem. A prominent example here is the ILP Vegetable and the Librassay 
clearinghouse. Policy driven (‘pull’) models follow a rather ‘idealistic’ logic: usually – 
though not necessarily – set up voluntarily or mandatorily by governmental/non-
governmental institutions (top down), they follow government rules (e.g. low price or 
free license) in an attempt to serve a public policy objective. Key examples include the 
MPP pool, the Golden Rice pool and the WIPO Re:Search initiative. 
It is remarkable to see that market driven actors release their patents free of charge in the 
context of policy driven models, such as the MPP pool, the Golden Rice pool and the 
                                                 
113 The term ‘blocking patent’ is not clear and can be used in different ways. In its widest sense, any patent 
is by definition a blocking patent, as a patent confers upon its proprietor the right to stop others from 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented invention (See art. 28 1 TRIPs 
Agreement).  Used in this sense, the notion blocking patent is a tautology. In a more narrow sense, a 
blocking patent is a patent covering essential features of the invention which cannot be invented around. In 
its strictest sense, a blocking patent is a patent covering essential features which are licensed in a very 
restrictive manner. The risk of a blocking position arises if one of the essential technologies is licensed on 
exclusive terms so third parties cannot have access to part of the technology deemed necessary to 
manufacture a product. In the present chapter – as in our previous research – the term ‘blocking patent’ will 
be used in the second, more narrow, albeit multi-layered sense. See G. Van Overwalle [2009] footnote 15, 
at 381. 
114 See e-licensing platform from Syngenta, where the following is said in the FAQ section: “What is your 
view on stacking multiple native traits? At the moment we don't see the need to handle differently the case 
of multiple native traits stacked in one variety, as the number of patents available per species is often one 
only. This may change in the future as the industry practices evolve”. However, it is suggested that 
problems may arise when multiple enabling technology are at play: “Can I get a discount when licensing 
simultaneously multiple Enabling Technologies? Yes, for enabling technologies a licensee can access two 
licenses for a discount of 25% on each of the two license fees to be paid to Syngenta. Whereas, for three or 
more licenses the licensee will be eligible for a discount of 35% on each of the license fees actually paid to 
Syngenta.” See http://www3.syngenta.com/global/e-licensing/en/e-
licensing/About/Pages/Frequentlyaskedquestions.aspx (last visited October 20, 2015). 
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WIPO Re-Search initiative.115 Recent economic research has looked into the 
motivation(s) why firms release their patents free of charge in such a context. Four 
ultimate motives of free patent release approaches have been identified: profit making, 
cost cutting, innovation catalyzing and technology providing. Firms may obtain valuable 
technological input for subsequent innovations as well as social benefits in return for 
their free patent release.116 In short, firms may obtain non-monetary benefits from their 
free patent release on collaborative, policy driven models. 
 
4.2. Changing institutional design. Towards ‘hybrid’ models 
 
Over the last decade, no significant developments can be noted on the institutional set up 
patent pools and clearinghouses, in terms of their coming into existence. First, 
collaborative rights models may be established as a result of the voluntary engagement of 
the patent owners, or as the result of a compulsory licensing mechanism initiated by the 
government. In the life sciences initiatives under study, voluntary negotiations have been 
the prevailing mode of initiation. Second, collaborative institutions may be set up by 
private actors or by governmental institutions. In the life sciences cases under study, 
some platforms have been initiated by public, governmental institutions, and some others 
have been set up by private entities (e.g. ILP Vegetable, Syngenta e-licensing, Enza 
zaden). Third, collaborative models may encompass private and/or public patent holders. 
From the examples under study, some collaborative licensing models encompass private 
patent holders (e.g. MPP, Golden Rice, WIPO Re:Search), other initiatives solely include 
public technology providers (e.g. PIPRA), whereas still others include both public and 
private technology holders. 
 
No meaningful developments can be observed relating to the management structure, in 
terms of administering entity, either. A patent pool may be managed directly by the 
patentee or indirectly through a new entity that is specifically set up for the 
administration of the pool.117 In the clearinghouse model the central entity, acting as a go-
between for patentees and licensees, is a key feature. Most cases under study act through 
a central entity, apart from the two single-firm initiatives (Syngenta e-licensing and Enza 
Zaden) who operate via the patent holding firm. 
 
However, interesting institutional changes can be observed when it comes to the 
relationship between the patent holders involved in a patent pool or clearinghouse. In a 
patent pool normally strong relations emerge between all patent holders, resulting in a set 
up agreement amongst all pool members. In contrast, a clearinghouse will most probably 
not be established by an agreement amongst patent holders, but will come into existence 
through a series of separate contracts between a central, administering body and an 
                                                 
115 N. Ziegler, O. Gassman & S. Friesike,’Why do firms give away their patents for free?’, World Patent 
Information, 2013, 1-7. 
116 Ziegler et al. [2013] footnote 115. 
117 On the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” licensing, see C. Shapiro, ‘Setting Compatibility 
Standards: Cooperation or Collusion’, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, R. Dreyfuss, 
D. L. Zimmerman, & H. First (eds.), Oxford Univ. Press, 2001, 81-102. 
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individual patent holder, rather than by an agreement amongst patent holders.118 Over the 
last few years, lesser platforms seem to emerge taking the shape of patent pools in the 
narrow legal sense, and more ‘hybrid’ models are created. The MPP deviates from a strict 
patent pool model, as it does not entail a prior multiparty agreement between all patent 
owners to license one or more of their patents to one another, but solely encompasses 
agreements between the patent owners and the pool – acting as an intermediary – after 
which the pool sub licenses their patents to third parties.119 On the other hand, the MPP 
pool does align itself with the patent pool philosophy, in that it covers relevant patents for 
the production of one particular disease, rather than acting as a ‘supermarket’ for a 
variety of disease related patents. In turn, ILP Vegetable – a clearinghouse at first sight – 
contains a few elements which resemble a patent pool. It is set up as a multiparty 
agreement between the participating companies, and strongly characterized by a 
membership principle, possibly creating a club atmosphere.120 
 
4.2.1. Competition law analysis. Level of essentiality 
 
The qualification as a patent pool, a clearinghouse or a hybrid model is not a frivolous or 
semantic exercise, but is highly relevant for two reasons. First, depending on the type of 
collaborative licensing platform, competition law issues are entailed. In an attempt to deal 
with any potential anticompetitive effects of multiparty licensing agreements and the 
preclusion of cartels, the European Commission has established some rules. Nowadays, 
the major competition rules relating to technology licensing are laid down in the 
Commission Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No. 316/2014 on Technology Transfer 
Agreements121 and the Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the TFEU to 
                                                 
118 See G. Van Overwalle [2010] footnote 15, at 305-324. In this regard, it might be argued that patent 
pools are true collaborative licensing measures (referring to models where people work together), whereas 
clearinghouses could be typified as collective licensing measures (referring to models which involve all 
members, but without presupposing prior collaboration between them). See G. Van Overwalle, 
‘Individualism, Collectivism and Openness in Patent Law: from Exclusion to Inclusion Through Licensing, 
in Individualism and Collectiveness in Intellectual Property Law, Jan Rósen (ed.), Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar [2012] 71-114. 
119 Cf. E. van Zimmeren et al. [2011] footnote 15, 1, 3. 
120 Furthermore, it is worth noting that other institutional modes of collaboration have cropped up in the life 
sciences, such as public private partnerships (PPPs). These collaborative initiatives involve active 
commitment and knowledge spill-overs between companies, customers, suppliers, universities, research 
institutes, consortia and start-ups. Hence, there is a need for well-tailored IP strategies that support the spirit 
of the collaboration, enable knowledge flows, allow for value appropriation and facilitate 
commercialization. See H. Stevens, G. Van Overwalle, B. Van Looy & I. Huys, ‘ IP Policies in Early-Phase 
Research in Public-Private Partnerships: An Overview and Assessment of Current Practices’ [2016], 
Nature Biotechnology (In Press); H. Stevens, G. Van Overwalle, B. Van Looy & I. Huys, ‘Innovative 
Medicines Initiative (IMI) Case Study Analysis Reveals the True Added Value of Early-Phase Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs) [2015], 34 Biotechnology Law Report, 153-165; H. Stevens, G. Van Overwalle, 
B. Van Looy & I. Huys, ‘Perspectives and Opportunities for Precompetitive Public-Private Partnerships in 
the Biomedical Sector’ [2013], 32 Biotechnology Law Report, 131-139; D. Nicol, J. Nielsen, J Liddicoat, C 
Critchley and T Whitton, The Innovation Pool in Biotechnology. The Role of Patents in Facilitating 
Innovation, Hobart: Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No. 8 [2014], 285 p. New legal 
problems are likely to emerge, see E. van Zimmeren et al. [2011] footnote 15, 1, 3 
121 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 316/2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ L, 93/17, 28 March 
2014. 
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Technology Transfer Agreements.122 Close examination of this regulation and the 
guidelines provides valuable information on the attitude of European authorities towards 
patent pools. In short, in the European Union, the creation and organization of patent 
pools will most probably be accepted if they meet the seven conditions of the ‘safe 
harbor’ provided by the guidelines. The seven conditions include: open participation to 
the creation of the pool to all interested parties, inclusion of essential technologies, 
sufficient safeguards regarding the exchange of sensitive information, non-exclusive 
licenses to the pool, FRAND-terms, ban on non-challenge clause (including termination 
clause), authorization to develop competing products and technology.123 So, just to point 
to one issue: if a platform meets the patent pool definition, only essential patents can be 
collected on the platform. 
The European rules do not contain any explicit guidance relating to clearinghouses. 
However, parties to clearinghouses should also be aware of the potentially anti-
competitive restrictions in their agreement that might lead to a violation of competition 
law. The concerns of the competition authorities might vary according to the actual legal 
structure chosen for the clearinghouse (for example, a private entity that comprises patent 
holders as its members, or a neutral, independent, public clearing institution).124 In 
general, we take the view that clearinghouses may contain essential and complementary 
patents, as well as substitute patents. 
 
The cases under study in fact seem to be mostly clearinghouses, rather than patent pools 
in the strict legal sense. We therefore assume that the presence of both essential and 
substitute patents on their platforms will not trigger any anti-competitive problems as a 
matter of principle. Besides, rather than fixating too one-sidedly on the question of which 
precise institutional structure shall be implemented (a patent pool or a clearinghouse), 
priority should be given to the question of which ultimate objective the collaborative 
mechanism wishes to serve, a market failure or a developmental/societal problem. As to 
policy driven/pull models, it might be desirable to loosen competition law rules for such 
non-profit initiatives.125 
 
4.2.2. Liability rule analysis. Level of openness 
 
A second reason to look into the institutional architecture of collaborative licensing 
platforms relates to their ability to transform the property rule into a liability rule. 
Collaborative licensing platforms, such as patent pools and patent clearinghouses, may 
turn the property rule into a (private) liability rule, crafting guaranteed access to patents, 
in the sense that licenses have not to be bargained and negotiations cannot result in a veto 
to access the patented technology. The concept of liability rules finds its origin in the 
entitlement theory articulated by Calabresi & Melamed in their epoch-making 
contribution ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
                                                 
122 Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
technology transfer agreements, OJ C 89/03, 28 March 2014. 
123 Paragraph 261 of the Guidelines. Also see M. Konigs, ‘The Guidelines on technology transfer 
agreements: the second edition and its consequences on patent pools’ [2014]  9 JIPLP, 1012-1016. 
124 E. van Zimmeren [2009] footnote 15, 63-119. 
125 G. Van Overwalle [2009] footnote 15, 381 ff. 
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Cathedral’.126 Entitlement theory mainly distinguishes between entitlements protected by 
property or liability rules. As Merges puts it, property rules are “absolute permission 
rules”: one cannot take the entitlements without prior permission of the holder, whereas 
liability rules are “take now, pay later” rules: others can use the entitlement without 
permission of the owner, so long as they adequately compensate the owner later.127 
Translating the Calabresi-Melamed concepts to the IP arena, Reichman describes a 
liability rule as a rule “that takes the form of an automatic license without the power to 
exclude”.128  
Patent pools, requiring as a matter of competition law open and non-discriminatory 
licensing policies vis à vis everyone, convert the exclusivity principle of patent protection 
into a liability regime. A patent pool is an example of a contractually-constructed liability 
regime, created when “contracting parties start with property rule entitlements, and wind 
up subject to a collectively-determined liability rule”,129 which takes place when 
stakeholders voluntarily seek to obtain private ordering with outcomes that differ from 
what the default rules of IP law might otherwise provide.130 Put differently, patent pools 
create universal (open to all) and conditional openness, the condition being payment of a 
fee; in exchange for a fee, they turn exclusive patent rights into commonly shared 
assets.131 
Standardized and royalty collecting clearinghouses, if characterized by ex ante disclosure 
of standardized licensing and royalty conditions, also convert the exclusivity principle of 
patent protection into a liability regime thereby creating universal and conditional access, 
the condition being payment of a fee. This type of clearinghouse also turns the exclusive 
patent right into shared use.132 However, if the licenses offered by the clearinghouse are 
only available for qualified users, the effect would be restricted access, and the 
transformation from a property rule dominated to a liability rule governed regime would 
not take place. In this regard, technology exchange clearinghouses do not always trigger 
the transformation from a right to exclude to a right to remuneration, as they might 
mainly serve as a marketplace to find licensing partners, where the patent holder keeps 
                                                 
126 G. Calabresi and A.D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’ [1972] 85 Harv. L. Rev., 1089-1092. This title refers to Claude Monet’s series of paintings of 
Roeun Cathedral, implying that the authors’ academic analysis is but one look at a subject that can be 
considered from various points of view. 
127 Merges [1996] footnote 27, at 1293, 1302. 
128 See J. H. Reichman, ‘Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable 
Innovation’ [2000] 53 Vanderbilt Law Review, 1743-1798. Also see  J.H. Reichman and T. Lewis, ‘Using 
Liability Rules to Stimulate Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge’, in 
International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, 
K.E. Maskus and J.H. Reichman (eds.), 2005, 337-366. For an up to date analysis, see Krauspenhaar who 
qualifies collaborative licensing platforms as ‘private liability rules’ (Krauspenhaar [2015] footnote 33, at 
26 ff. 
129 See Merges [1996] footnote 27, at 1303, who called the process of creating “contracting into liability 
rules”, and the resulting organizations “private liability rule organizations”. 
130 See J. H. Reichman & P. Uhlir, ‘A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data 
in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment’ [2003] 66 Law and Contemporary Problems, 
315-462 from whom the term “contractually-constructed liability regime” has been drawn. Also see 
Reichman [2000] footnote 128; Reichman & Lewis [2005] footnote 128. 
131 G. Van Overwalle [2009] footnote 15, at 381; G. Van Overwalle [2012] footnote 118. 
132 See G. Van Overwalle [2012] footnote 118. 
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the authority to exclude certain licensees, and where – in the event the licensee is 
accepted – licenses are individually crafted.133 
 
From the cases under study, the Syngenta e-Licensing platform manifestly meets the 
criteria to transform the property rule into a liability rule. This platform provides 
universal (open to all), and conditional openness (payment of a fee), where the details 
have been clarified ex ante (fixed fee or customized menus of licensing terms tailored to 
the needs of different licensee profiles).134 Also the IPL Vegetable platform meets the 
criteria to transform the property rule in to a liability regime. ILP Vegetable provides 
universal (open to all) and conditional openness (payment of an annual fee; contribution 
of respective patents to the platform) (see Figure 6). The implementation of a reciprocity 
rule into the platform does not seem to hamper the universality of the openness, as 
everyone is invited to join the platform under this condition. On the contrary, the quid-
pro-quo mechanism may well trigger technology holders, who are hesitant or unwilling to 
commit their patents to the platform, to participate in the platform and ultimately enlarge 
the total portfolio of patents available on the platform to include all interested users. 
More unclear is the MPP, where the licenses offered seem only available for qualified 
users, namely generic manufacturers. In practice, however, such an effect might be 
negligible, as apart from the qualified users no one would probably (wish to) apply. 
The transition from a property rule to a liability rule has met with considerable sympathy 
in academic circles, researching initiatives which fuel the sharing ideology.135 However, 
it is important to note that a liability rule regime – shifting the control over the gate of 
access to technology from patents to fees – may lead to a system where no longer patents 
but (exorbitant) fees hinder access to technology. The recent literature on patent hold-up 
illustrates this point very well. Patent hold-up might occur when a patent holder is able 
and has an incentive to claim royalties that far exceed the economic value of the 
protected invention. If a user who requires a licence has already invested in a technology 
and the switching costs are higher than the requested royalties, it would hardly have 
another choice but to pay excessively high royalty rates demanded by the patent owner. 
The risk of being held up might become higher when patent ownership is dispersed. 
Hold-up might deter firms’ investments in innovation.136 
 
4.3. Disputed effect on innovation 
 
From the very onset, the economic impact of collaborative licensing mechanisms has 
been discussed. An old concern revolves around the question whether patent pools and 
                                                 
133 See G. Van Overwalle [2012] footnote 118. 
134 E. van Zimmeren [2009] footnote 15. 
135 See S. Dusollier, ‘Sharing Access to Intellectual Property through Private Ordering’ [2007] Chicago-
Kent Law Review, 1391, 1416-1427. Also see G. Van Overwalle, ‘Inventing Inclusive Patents. From Old to 
New Open Innovation’ [2015] 1 Kritika: Essays on Intellectual Property, P. Drahos, G. Ghidini & H. 
Ullrich (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2015, 206-277. 
136 See EPO Economic and Scientific Advisory Board (ESAB), Report on Patent aggregation and its 
impact on competition and innovation policy, Munich, 25 November 2014 (available at 
http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/esab/workshops.html, last visited October 23, 2015). 
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clearinghouses create “markets for lemons,”137 and whether they succeed in attracting 
valuable patents. Over the last years, research is increasingly concentrating on the 
question to what extent collaborative licensing mechanisms encourage innovation in 
general, and ‘open innovation’ in particular. 
 
4.3.1. Effect on innovation in general 
 
Patent pools are expected to encourage innovation, as they eliminate stacking licenses, 
reduce licensing transaction costs through the introduction of a system of ‘one stop 
licensing’ for non-member licensees, decrease patent litigation and stimulate funding for 
research and development.138 However, empirical evidence on the effects of patent pools 
on innovation is scarce. Recent research from Lampe and Moser uses data from the first 
patent pool in US history – the sewing machine pool (1856-1877) – to investigate the 
potential effects of a pool on the rate and direction of technical change and innovation. 
Contrary to theoretical predictions, the sewing machine pool appears to have reduced, 
rather than increased the rate of technical change in sewing machines, in particular for 
the members of the pool.139 Patenting declined after the creation of the pool,140 and 
alternative measures of innovation confirm that the rate of technical change slowed after 
the pool had formed and increased again after it had dissolved. Follow on research from 
Lampe and Moser further indicates that pools may also alter the direction of technical 
change in an unexpected way. The creation of a patent pool may encourage, rather than 
discourage innovation in (technologically inferior) substitutes and divert R&D from pool 
technologies towards substitutes.141 
 
More empirical research would be welcome to further investigate the presumed negative 
and dis-incentivizing effect of patent pools in the life sciences, and the extent to which 
the same conclusion holds for clearinghouses. Recent research seems to suggest that the 
                                                 
137 G. A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ [1970], 84 
Quarterly J. Econ. 488. 
138 Supra, Section 3.1.1. 
139 Lampe & Moser found reduction in patenting and innovation (notably in stiches per minute, as an 
objectively quantifiable measure of performance) from members in the pool (lockstitch technology), in 
contrast to non-members, exploring inferior technologies (chain technology). The pool fostered innovation 
in competing technology (chain stitch) by new firms. 
140 R. Lampe and P. Moser, ‘Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century 
Sewing Machine Industry’ [2010] June 8? 
141 R. Lampe and P. Moser, ‘Patent Pools and the Direction of Innovation’ [2010] December 19; R. Lampe 
and P. Moser, ‘Patent Pools and the Direction of Innovation. Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing 
Machine Industry’, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper Series [2011] 
November (Working Paper 17573, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17573, last visited October 
12, 2015). Lampe and Moser found that non-members were exploring substitute, inferior technologies 
(chain technology) and conclude that the pool fostered innovation in competing technology (chain stich) by 
new firms. The main difference between chain stitch and lockstitch are the threads: chain stitch uses only 
one thread (which breaks faster), whereas lockstitch uses two threads (one through the loops of the other, in 
chainstitch the same thread goes through its own loops). See http://home.howstuffworks.com/sewing-
machine1.htm (last visited October 13, 2015). 
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negative effect applies to both pools and clearinghouses, or any regime that turns the 
property rule regime into a liability rule.142 
 
4.3.2. Effect on ‘open innovation’  
 
Recent economic literature has paid a lot of attention on ‘open innovation’143 and on the 
role of IP and collaborative licensing platforms in facilitating open innovation. The term 
open innovation was coined by Henry Chesbrough in 2003,144 who defined open 
innovation as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate 
internal innovation and expand markets for external use of innovation, respectively”.145 
Taken together, this strand of economic research provides empirical evidence for firms’ 
increased reliance upon external sources of knowledge to accelerate internal research and 
development.146 In both economic and legal research it was clarified that open innovation 
heavily relies on IP147 and on licensing agreements as an organizational mode to pursue 
innovation, both for inbound and outbound open innovation.148 Thoughtful scholars have 
suggested that collaborative license mechanisms are no longer mainly established to deal 
with (milder forms of) patent fragmentation in the life sciences, but might assist in 
establishing ‘open innovation’ in that area.149 
 
An empirical study we undertook on the role of collaborative licensing models in the life 
sciences – more in particular in medical biotechnology, which was undertaken in 2007-
2008 in parallel in Europe150 and in Australia151 – added meaningful insights to the 
debate. The findings revealed that respondents generally had more experience with 
bilateral licencing (one-to-one licencing) and cross-licensing, than with patent pools or 
clearinghouses. In addition, stakeholders clearly favoured bilateral licences over 
collaborative licensing models. Patent owners are especially concerned about the loss of 
control of the bargaining process and licensing conditions, the loss of exclusivity and the 
                                                 
142 See Krauspenhaar [2015] footnote 33, additionally pointing to problems of under-compensation, under-
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143 For a recent review of the economic literature, see A. B. Kovács, B. Van Looy and B. Cassiman, 
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loss of secrecy when they participate in a collaborative licensing scheme.152 More recent 
empirical case study research on collaborative licensing strategies in the medical field 
supports these earlier findings that collaborative license strategies are conceived to 
provide little advantage.153 So, to date there has not been compelling evidence of 
industry-wide interest in the adoption of patent pools, clearinghouses or other IP-related 
collaborative strategies in biotechnology, and formalised collaborative strategies seem to 
have no great appeal for industry. It remains to be seen to what extent the emergence of 
aggregation as a means of acquiring a package of tools is seen as a more meaningful 
alternative.154 
Furthermore, ‘open innovation’ is increasingly coming under legal scrutiny, resulting in 
attention for new complex legal problems, such as co-ownership in all kinds of 
collaborative agreements.155 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Over the last decade, concerns have been expressed that the life sciences are crowded 
with patents, to the extent that the freedom to use protected inventions may be 
considerably limited. Recent empirical research indicates that the emergence of a wide 
patent thicket problem in the life sciences has not actuated as a worldwide phenomenon, 
and that the expected global impact has been less profound. If there is a patent thicket 
problem in the life sciences, it may sector-wise well be limited to genetic diagnostics and 
it may geographically mainly be restricted to the US. Past and present empirical research 
indicates that there is no strong evidence for the existence of devastating patent thickets, 
frustrating the use of technology and ultimately leading to a ‘tragedy of the anti-
commons’, in the field of genetics. So, time has come to put this alluring metaphor, 
which intensely dominated the (academic) debate for the last 15 years, to rest in the area 
of genetics. 
 
Starting from the assumption that the outcrop of patents might result in hindering patent 
thickets in specific sectors, such as genetic diagnostics, various measures were 
contemplated over the past decade to facilitate access to fragmented patented technology 
and render scattered proprietary inventions accessible for further use. Patent pool 
schemes and clearinghouse models were suggested to settle the presence of multiple 
patents and multiple patent holders and offer a solution for inventors who wish to gain 
access to a cluster of patents. 
The fact that the hypothesized tragedy of the anti-commons did not manifestly occur, 
may well provide an explanation why patent pools and clearinghouses have not emerged 
widely in the life sciences over the last years. Another reason may be the lack of 
knowledge or the negative perception of these models. Yet, another explanation why 
pools and clearinghouses have not developed exponentially, may be that the key 
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objective of patent pools and clearinghouses – addressing fragmentation – has been taken 
up by other actors, such as patent aggregators. In response, existing pools and 
clearinghouses have developed new tasks and additional services – such as providing 
legal, financial and negotiation assistance. 
On the other hand, the emergence of collaborative license mechanisms with a different 
objective can be witnessed. Rather than addressing fragmentation, platforms have lately 
been created to facilitate transfer of single (potentially blocking) patents. Furthermore, 
the creation of platforms with hybrid structures can be observed, mixing characteristics 
from both patent pools and clearinghouses. Last but not least, other institutional modes of 
collaboration have cropped up in the life sciences, such as public private partnerships 
(PPPs), resulting in new types of legal problems. 
 
Future research may focus on new areas of concern. It has been argued that litigation and 
ever-evolving technological and business models have killed business strategies based on 
patented and monopoly-priced genes, exemplified in the Myriad case.156 Academic 
inquiry should investigate new strategies of closing off access to technology or 
knowledge by way of proprietary databases of genetic test information.157 
Future research might also investigate the conceptual, legal and practical differences 
between collaborative licensing platforms discussed here, and ‘sharing platforms’ 
epitomized by Airbnb, Uber and Couchsurfing. Current legal debates mainly focus on the 
treatment of activities taking place within the sharing economy under competition law, 
tax law, anti-discrimination law, consumer law, liability law, and to the status of tangible 
property involved. 158 However, scholarly literature on the sharing economy has devoted 
little attention so far to the sharing discourse in the field of intangible, intellectual 
property.  
Last but not least, future research may also investigate new models fostering sharing of 
IP, such as the recently proposed ‘inclusive patent’ regime.159 
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